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Abstract
In modern democracies, trust in government is a key indicator of political legitimacy and stability. Drawing 
from theories of media effects, we investigated whether using traditional media has a negative (media 
malaise hypothesis) or a positive (virtuous circle hypothesis) impact on trust in the national government. 
We used a serial mediation model involving evaluations of politicians and evaluations of the political process 
as mediators of how political communications influence trust in government. To test the model empirically, 
we conducted an online survey among 1 115 respondents in Germany. Results suggest that the use of tra-
ditional media to access political information has a direct positive impact on trust in government mediated 
by people’s evaluations of politicians and of the political process. We also found a positive serial mediation 
effect of using traditional media on trust in government mediated first by evaluations of politicians and sec-
ond by evaluations of the political process. 
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1 Introduction
In modern democracies, the amount of 
trust that people place in politics is a key 
indicator of political legitimacy and sta-
bility (Aarts, Fladmoe, & Strömbäck, 2012; 
Easton, 1965). Consequently, the substan-
tial decline of political trust in Western de-
mocracies since the 1960s poses consid-
erable reason for concern (Hetherington, 
2005; Torcal, 2014). Although some au-
thors have viewed the trend as a chance to 
raise a “new generation of critical citizens” 
(Marien & Hooghe, 2011, p. 267), most 
scholars have highlighted the detrimental 
effects of such eroding levels of political 
trust. The dominant view in the debate 
maintains that political distrust decreases 
voter turnout (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007) 
and fosters support for populist parties 
(Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Pauwels, 2011). 
Since mass media remain the primary 
source of political information in West-
ern-type democracies, their importance 
as generators and inhibitors of political 
trust has been widely recognized in po-
litical communication research. In litera-
ture on the topic, two opposing concepts 
characterize the effects of media use on 
political trust. On the one hand, the media 
malaise hypothesis posits that negative 
media content and its lack of substance 
cultivate public mistrust in politics (Ca-
pella & Jamieson, 1997; Robinson, 1976). 
On the other, scholars have argued that the 
relationship between media exposure and 
political trust can be conceived as a virtu-
ous circle (Norris, 2000), in which people 
with higher levels of political interest use 
a variety of media sources and thereby de-
velop increased trust in politics. Empirical 
evidence for both claims has yielded in-
conclusive results. However, at times when 
the term «Lügenpresse» (“lying press”) is 
chanted in public demonstrations and 
even named the official “non-word of the 
year” in Germany, insights about the con-
sequences of media use on political atti-
tudes are needed more than ever. 
In response, we examined trust in gov-
ernment by conducting an online survey 
in order to extend current literature on 
the topic in two important dimensions. 
In what follows, we first introduce and re-
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port an outcome-based measurement for 
trust in government. Second, we discuss 
various mediation effects that we concep-
tualize as trust reasons –that is, reasons 
for trusting one’s national government 
(Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Ultimately, we 
propose a serial mediation model running 
from respondents’ media use for political 
information, through their evaluations of 
politicians and evaluations of the polit-
ical process to their trust in government. 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an 
online survey among 1 115 respondents in 
Germany.
2 Trust in government
Because trust is a broad, multifaceted 
construct, scholars have developed and 
extended several concepts to shed light 
on the objects of political trust. At base, 
political trust refers to “a basic evaluative 
or affective orientation toward the gov-
ernment” (Miller, 1974, p. 952). To date, 
however, in exactly whom or what people 
essentially trust when discussing political 
trust remains controversial (Catterberg & 
Moreno, 2005; Wong, Wan, & Hsiao, 2011). 
According to Owen and Dennis (2001), 
the various objects of political trust in-
clude national legislatures (Hibbing & 
Theiss-Morse, 1995), presidential incum-
bents (Citrin & Green, 1986), national 
and local governments (Levi & Stoker, 
2000; Ulbig, 2008), political institutions 
(Zmerli & Newton, 2008), and the polit-
ical system as a whole (Gamson, 1968). 
Imagining less distinction among objects 
of trust, research stemming from the Eu-
ropean Social Survey and European Values 
Survey often merges trust in government, 
parliament, the legal system, and the po-
lice into the single concept of institutional 
trust (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007; Hooghe & 
Marien, 2012; Marien & Hooghe, 2011). 
Early on, Citrin (1974) suggested subdi-
viding political trust by discriminating at-
titudes affiliated with mistrust, including 
dissatisfaction with current government 
policy positions, dissatisfaction with the 
outcomes of ongoing events and policies, 
mistrust of incumbent officeholders, and 
the rejection of the entire political system. 
Decades later, Hetherington (1998, p. 792) 
developed that distinction by arguing that 
political trust consists of support for “re-
gime-level political objects regardless of 
performance,” or diffuse support, as well 
as support for political incumbents, or 
specific support (Easton, 1965). Neverthe-
less, literature addressing political trust re-
mains divided regarding the objects of po-
litical trust. Consequently, as Torcal (2014, 
p. 1544) has observed, the interchangeable 
conceptualization of political trust and 
trust in government “is responsible for the 
traditional confusion between satisfaction 
with incumbents (political satisfaction) 
and political trust in the system.” Draw-
ing from that argument, we examined the 
specific form of trust that citizens place in 
their national government.
Trust in government, like any form of 
trust, is based on expectations about the 
future. As such, it encourages citizens to 
make risky investments in the future to-
day. For instance, trust in government en-
ables citizens to delegate political power to 
individual political actors whom they do 
not know personally via the concept of the 
sovereignty of the people. By actively sup-
porting or at least accepting an incumbent 
government, citizens entrust authority 
over state affairs and even parts of their in-
come in the form of taxes to a rather small 
group of politicians without being able to 
effectively assess their job capability in ad-
vance (Levi & Stoker, 2000). For citizens to 
do so, not only legal compulsion but also 
trust is paramount. This investment is 
risky because citizens cannot be sure that 
the entrusted resources, such as political 
power and money, will be used responsi-
bly, that is, in accordance to personal or 
societal hopes, wishes, and needs. Citizens 
are well aware that democratic decision 
making is highly contingent upon various 
conditions and that political promises are 
often broken after elections. Eroding levels 
of political trust therefore arguably reduce 
voter turnout in elections (Grönlund & 
Setälä, 2007; Shaffer, 1981), discourage 
institutionalized political participation 
(Hooghe & Marien, 2012), undermine the 
public’s willingness to pay taxes and less-
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en their compliance with laws (Marien & 
Hooghe, 2011), and spur voting for ex-
treme right and populist parties (Billiet & 
De Witte, 1995; Pauwels, 2011).
As Miller and Listhaug have observed, 
citizens base their political actions on 
“evaluations of whether or not political 
authorities and institutions are perform-
ing in accordance with normative expec-
tations held by the public” (1990, p. 358). 
Accordingly, any comprehensive concep-
tualization of trust in government needs to 
specify those normative expectations –that 
is, what citizens refer to when they say that 
they trust or distrust the government. They 
added, however, that trust in government 
is rarely absolute (e. g., blind trust) and, 
more often than not, refers to context-spe-
cific expectations (Miller & Listhaug, 1990). 
By analogy, a patient trusts his or her doc-
tor to cure diseases but not to solve other 
personal problems; likewise, citizens trust 
the government not in general but, on the 
contrary, to take specific action in the fu-
ture. In line with “extant research (…) us-
ing policy outcomes as the implicit object 
of citizens’ trust” (Gershtenson & Plane, 
2007, p. 5), we argue that people ultimate-
ly place their trust in the outcomes of po-
litical decision making, such as personal 
freedom, peace, economic wealth, social 
welfare, and a healthy natural environ-
ment. By extension, we propose that indi-
viduals’ expectations about future policy 
outcomes form the core of political trust 
(Citrin & Muste, 1999; Listhaug, 1995). We 
therefore use Hetherington’s (2005, p. 9) 
definition of trust in government “as the 
degree to which people perceive that gov-
ernment is producing outcomes consis-
tent with their expectations.” 
Such expectations are based on indi-
viduals’ experiences and observations as 
well as different kinds of secondhand in-
formation. Personal, everyday experienc-
es with political decisions such as energy 
prices or tax policies, of course, strongly 
shape people’s expectations for future 
political outcomes. Thus, we expect me-
diated secondhand information about po-
litical outcomes to bear only slight direct 
effects upon people’s trust in government. 
However, we also argue that mediated in-
formation about political personnel (Ci-
trin & Luks, 1999; Miller & Borrelli, 1991; 
Seyd, 2015) and political processes (Mill-
er & Listhaug, 1990; Owen & Dennis, 2001) 
that enable political outcomes influence 
people’s trust in government as well. Re-
garding the role of individual actors in 
cultivating trust in abstract social systems, 
Giddens (1990, p. 85) has argued that con-
nections formed via such so-called face-
work connections “carry a reminder that 
it is flesh-and-blood people (…) who are 
its [the system’s] operators.” For instance, 
even though past experiences might not 
give citizens reason to expect tax reduc-
tions, they could nevertheless expect such 
reductions because they believe current 
political personnel to be more competent, 
more intelligent, more courageous, or 
more honest than their predecessors. Fur-
thermore, scholars have argued that trust 
in government stems from people’s per-
ceptions of political institutions and pro-
cesses (Kong, 2014; Lühiste, 2006; Miller & 
Listhaug, 1990). From that perspective, 
output performance depends on special 
qualities of the input structure of political 
systems. For instance, if citizens perceive 
political processes to be fair, transparent, 
and responsive, then they consequently 
expect the government to produce bet-
ter political outcomes. Thus, evaluations 
of both politicians and political process-
es shape individuals’ expectations about 
beneficial political outcomes in the future.
In sum, traditional conceptualizations 
of trust in government have failed to isolate 
the very core of trust: expectations about 
the outcomes of future actions of public 
trustees. Instead, they have compounded 
trust-related beliefs and supporting ideas 
into a single concept that fails to conclu-
sively conceive the trust-building process, 
as well as the role of news media therein. 
In response, we argue that expectations 
about future policy outcomes are the ob-
ject of people’s trust in government. We 
conceptualize all factors that build and 
shape those expectations – most notably, 
citizens’ evaluations of politicians and po-
litical processes – as reasons for trust. Last, 
we hypothesize that people’s chief sources 
of information about political actors and 
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processes are either personal experiences 
or mediated communication that provides 
secondhand information. In the following 
section, we discuss major consequences 
of news media environments for people’s 
perceptions of politics. 
3 Media effects 
Most literature addressing media effects 
on political trust (Avery, 2009; Strömbäck, 
Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2015) has been 
situated within the debate about whether 
using news media ultimately decreases 
trust in politics (i. e., the media malaise 
hypothesis, Robinson, 1976) or increas-
es it (i. e., the virtuous circle hypothesis, 
Norris, 2000). On the one hand, the media 
malaise hypothesis claims that reliance on 
TV news, its questionable credibility, and 
its tendency to stress negative aspects of 
politics (e. g., conflicts and scandals) have 
contributed to the decrease of political 
trust since the 1960s. On the other, Nor-
ris (2000) has argued that trust in politics 
and media exposure is best characterized 
by a circular relationship. In a cross-na-
tional analysis, she found that people with 
greater trust and interest in politics tend-
ed to access various media sources, which 
further increased their political trust and 
interest in politics, whereas the politically 
disinterested and distrusting did not pay 
attention to the news media in the least 
(Norris, 2000). To avoid confusion with 
overlapping concepts (e. g., trust in insti-
tutions), we review only literature specifi-
cally addressing trust in government. 
To date, empirical studies investigat-
ing how using news media influences trust 
in government have yielded inconclusive 
results. Whereas some studies have sug-
gested that accessing various kinds of news 
media, especially on TV, negatively affects 
trust in government (Avery, 2009; Mutz & 
Reeves, 2005; Pietsch & Martin, 2011; Ts-
fati, Tukachinsky, & Peri, 2009; Valentino, 
Beckmann & Buhr, 2001), others have in-
dicated its positive influence (Moy & Pfau, 
2000; Norris, 2000) or else its lack of any 
significant effect whatsoever (Bennett, 
Rhine, Flickinger & Bennett, 1999; Moy & 
Scheufele, 2000). From another angle, 
some authors have also reported condi-
tional effects according to news source 
(Avery, 2009) or effects of a source’s ideo-
logical leaning and the ideological views 
of each citizen (Ceron & Memoli, 2015). 
The ambiguity of such results could derive 
from the trend that most studies either 
focus on a single medium or compare the 
impacts of different media with each other. 
However, other scholars have posited that 
media users typically do not access only 
newspapers, only TV news media, or only 
the internet to receive political informa-
tion but instead “combine different media 
contacts into a comprehensive pattern of 
exposure” (Hasebrink & Popp, 2006, p. 369; 
cf. Hasebrink & Domeyer, 2012; Taneja, 
Webster, Malthouse & Ksiazek, 2012; Yuan, 
2011). That strand of literature argues that 
studies focusing on a single type of media 
could over- or underestimate the media 
effect. For instance, if watching TV news 
negatively influences the viewer’s trust in 
government but reading the newspaper 
has a positive influence, the effects could 
cancel each other out if respondents use 
both sources to access political informa-
tion. To account for such effects among 
media users, we investigate the impact of 
media use in general terms by asking the 
following research question:
 › RQ: To what extent does the use of tra-
ditional media to access political infor-
mation directly affect trust in govern-
ment?
Given the mentioned theoretical reasons, 
we expect to detect indirect effects of me-
dia use on trust in government mediated 
by two sets of trust reasons. First, we hy-
pothesize that evaluations of political de-
cision makers, especially influential na-
tional-level politicians often covered by 
news media, act as crucial predictors of 
trust in government. To explain, as the per-
sonalization hypothesis suggests, individ-
uals instead of parties or institutions have 
become more important in political com-
munication (Van Aelst, Sheafer & Stanyer, 
2012). Moreover, as empirical studies have 
indicated, public perceptions of politi-
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cians are increasingly based on their in-
dividual characteristics such as compe-
tence, integrity, empathy, and charisma 
(Hellweg, Dionisopoulos & Kugler, 1989) 
instead of their political stances or party 
affiliations (Balmas & Sheafer, 2013; McAl-
lister, 2007). Since most citizens lack direct 
personal contact with politicians, news 
media provide important information that 
shapes their opinions about politicians’ 
individual characteristics. However, the 
question of whether news media nega-
tively or positively influence evaluations 
of politicians remains disputed. Some 
findings indicate a positive relationship 
(Kim & Kim, 2012), whereas others suggest 
that media use prompts more negative 
evaluations of politicians’ character traits 
(Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Mutz & 
Reeves, 2005). By contrast, some scholars 
have argued that “media use can induce 
positive or negative evaluations of politi-
cal leadership based on the tone in which 
media reports describe the issues“ (Camaj, 
2014, p. 190; cf. Kim & McCombs, 2007). 
Some studies investigating the nonverbal 
behavior of politicians have suggested that 
exposure to TV, as image-based media, can 
influence viewers’ evaluations of character 
traits (Bucy, 2000; Haumer & Donsbach, 
2009). Given such inconclusive empirical 
evidence regarding whether the hypothe-
sized mediation effect is positive or neg-
ative, we formulated our first hypothesis: 
 › H1: The use of traditional media to ac-
cess political information indirectly af-
fects trust in government mediated by 
evaluations of politicians.
The second set of trust reasons concerns 
perceptions of the political process. We 
hypothesize that people’s assessments of 
fundamental democratic concepts such 
as responsiveness, transparency, and pro-
cedural justice increase their level of trust 
in government (Camaj, 2014). Those per-
ceptions, in turn, are affected by people’s 
news media use (Camaj, 2014; Floss, 2008; 
Sadri & Flammia, 2014). Empirical studies 
investigating media effects on perceptions 
of democratic institutions and processes 
have generated inconclusive results. For 
instance, Camaj (2014, p. 187) posits that 
“the most important dimension of politi-
cal trust is media priming of institutional 
efficiency and honesty.” Furthermore, the 
results of Moy and colleagues indicate that 
media use has a positive influence on the 
perception of some institutions and pro-
cesses and a negative influence on others 
(Moy & Pfau, 2000; Moy, Pfau & Kahlor, 
1999). Taken together, those arguments in-
form our second hypothesis:
 › H2: The use of traditional media to ac-
cess political information indirectly af-
fects trust in government mediated by 
evaluations of political processes.
Last, drawing from the argument that po-
litical discourse increasingly centers on 
political personalities, we hypothesize 
that people’s evaluations of politicians 
also shape their evaluations of political 
processes. If people generally consider 
that politicians act responsibly, transpar-
ently, and fairly, then they will also consid-
er the political process to be responsive, 
transparent, and fair. Thus, evaluations of 
political actors not only directly influence 
people’s trust in government but might 
also influence another effective trust rea-
son: people’s evaluations of the political 
process. That dynamic prompts our third 
hypothesis: 
 › H3: The effect of using traditional me-
dia to access political information on 
trust in government is mediated first by 
evaluations of politicians and second 
by evaluations of the political process.
The serial mediation model shown in 
 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of the 
theoretical arguments and empirical find-
ings discussed thus far. 
4 Methods and data
4.1 Survey
To examine how the use of traditional 
media affects trust in government with 
cross-sectional data, we conducted an 
online survey using a nationwide online 
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access panel in Germany administered 
by Respondi AG. The average interview 
length was 14 minutes. 
4.2 Fieldwork and sample
Respondi recruits survey respondents 
on- and offline using a multichannel 
method (Respondi, 2016). Each panelist 
double-opted in to participating by com-
pleting an online registration form and 
activating an account. For nine days in 
August 2016, we gathered 1 329 completed 
questionnaires. Next, we cleaned the data-
set regarding the time that respondents 
spent on completing questionnaires. 
Respondents who answered all survey 
questions in fewer than 5 minutes were 
excluded from analyses, given extensive 
pretesting indicating the high improba-
bility that they completed their question-
naires carefully in so little time. Second, we 
identified respondents who simply clicked 
through the item batteries of the indepen-
dent variable, the two mediator variables, 
and the dependent variable. After apply-
ing those filtering processes, we identified 
1 115 respondents to include in statistical 
analyses. According to the standards of the 
American Association for Public Opinion 
Research, our study achieved a response 
rate of 0.604 (Response Rate 2, American 
Association for Public Opinion Research, 
2016).
Having conducted an online survey, 
we applied a quota system to match our 
sample to the German population of inter-
net users (M = 44.9 vs. M = 43.7) in terms of 
gender (47.1% women compared to 47.6%) 
and education (37.9% A levels compared 
to 37.1%; (Frees & Koch, 2015; GLES, 2015). 
4.3 Measures
For the purpose of our study, we con-
structed an independent variable, two 
mediating variables, a dependent variable, 
and several control variables. 
Trust in Government (Dependent Vari-
able). We conceive trust in government as 
a function of a person’s expectations of 
the national government’s ability to pro-
vide favorable outcomes. Accordingly, 
we measured trust in government using 
a two-step procedure. First, we asked re-
spondents to rate the favorability of 11 dif-
ferent policy outcomes on a seven-point 
Likert scale (1 = not favorable at all, 7 = very 
favorable): preserve peace in Europe 
and the world (M = 6.57, SD = 1.00), pro-
tect jobs and economic wealth (M = 6.21, 
SD = 1.09), ensure internal security and 
public order (M = 6.40, SD = 1.01), protect 
the environment and nature (M = 6.04, 
SD = 1.22), ensure individual freedom 
(M = 5.94, SD = 1.19), reduce social in-
equalities (M = 5.99, SD = 1.25), provide 
sufficient pensions (M = 6.24, SD = 1.13), 
integrate migrants into German society 
(M = 4.79, SD = 1.96), accomplish the ener-
gy transition (M = 5.32, SD = 1.54), provide 
a well-functioning educational system 
(M = 6.22, SD = 1.06), and foster European 
cohesion (M = 5.07, SD = 1.84). We exclud-
ed four items not considered to be highly 
favorable (i. e., received average scores of 
less than 6.0) from the second step of mea-
suring trust in government. In the second 
step, we asked respondents to rate their 
confidence in the German national gov-
ernment’s near-future achievement of the 
11 policy outcomes on a seven-point Likert 
scale (1 = not sure at all, 7 = very sure). We 
Figure 1: Conceptual serial mediation model explaining the impact of c on trust  
in government
Evaluations of 
Politicians
Evaluations of the 
Political Process
Trust in GovernmentTraditional Media Use
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used the remaining seven items from the 
first step to form a mean index (α = 0.94, 
M = 3.65, SD = 1.46).
Use of Traditional Media (Independent 
Variable). Using traditional media to ac-
cess political information was measured 
with eight items. We formed a consistent 
mean index (α = 0.76) encompassing four 
items addressing the use of print media, 
including their online editions, as well as 
three items addressing the use of TV and 
one item addressing the use of radio. The 
question asked on how many days in a 
typical week respondents read, watched, 
or listened to articles or news programs 
about politics or the government in seven 
types of media: regional newspapers or 
their respective online editions, nation-
wide newspapers or their respective on-
line editions, magazines or weekly news-
papers or their respective online editions, 
newsstand newspapers or their respec-
tive online editions, public broadcasting 
channels, private broadcasting channels, 
and the radio. The eighth item addressed 
the general use of political TV programs 
such as political talk shows or political 
satires. Responses were given on an eight-
point Likert scale (1 = never, 8 = every day; 
M = 3.54, SD = 1.53). 
Evaluations of Politicians (Mediat-
ing Variable). To measure perceptions of 
national politicians, we formed a consis-
tent mean index with 16 items (α = 0.91) 
used in the German Longitudinal Election 
Study. The 16 items consisted of seven 
subdimensions: autonomy (two items), 
nonpartisanship (two items), leadership 
(three items), integrity (three items), be-
nevolence (two items), responsiveness 
(two items), and likeability (two items). 
Table 1 in the appendix presents the ex-
act wording of the items. Respondents 
gave their answers on a seven-point Likert 
scale (1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree; 
M = 2.91, SD = 1.06). 
Evaluations of the Political Process 
(Mediating Variable). Various research-
ers have identified four major criteria to 
evaluate political processes: transparen-
cy (Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995), respon-
siveness (Lane, 1988), efficiency (Floss, 
2008), and procedural justice (Lind & Ty-
ler, 1988). We measured evaluations of the 
political process based on those four cri-
teria as subdimensions. We constructed 
three items to gauge transparency, used 
a three-item measure (Esaiasson, Kölln & 
Turper, 2015) to gauge perceived respon-
siveness, constructed three items to gauge 
efficiency, and slightly adapted Besley’s 
(2010) two-item measure to our topic (see 
exact wording in Table 1 in the appendix) 
to gauge procedural justice. Respondents 
were asked to either agree or disagree with 
each statement on a seven-point scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; 
M = 2.79, SD = 1.03). After reversing some 
items, we constructed a consistent mean 
index with all 11 items (α = 0.84).
Control Variables. Researchers have 
shown that trust in government is influ-
enced by political and social predisposi-
tions such as political interests, satisfac-
tion with democracy, perception of the 
economy, support for governing parties, 
and social trust (Hetherington & Ru-
dolph, 2008; Marien, 2011; Meer & Dek-
ker, 2011; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). Three 
items addressed the respondents’ interest 
in German, European, and non-Europe-
an international political affairs (α = 0.92, 
M = 4.61, SD = 1.62) using a seven-point 
Likert scale (1 = no interest at all, 7 = strong 
interest). Their satisfaction with democra-
cy (M = 4.06, SD = 1.80; seven-point Likert 
scale, 1 = very unsatisfied, 7 = very satisfied), 
their perception of the current state of the 
economy (M = 4.63, SD = 1.58; seven-point 
Likert scale, 1 = very bad, 7 = very good), 
and their support for a party currently 
governing Germany (42% “voted for one 
of the governing parties”) were assessed 
with single-item questions. Three items 
previously used in other studies addressed 
social trust (α = 0.73, M = 4.15, SD = 1.29), 
measured on a seven-point Likert scale 
(1 = totally disagree, 7 = totally agree). We 
also assessed sociodemographic variables 
(i. e., gender, age, education, and income) 
with single-item questions. 
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5 Results
To answer our research question and test 
our hypotheses, we ran ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) models with the 
use of traditional media as the indepen-
dent variable and trust in government as 
the dependent one. The hypothesized me-
diation effects were tested using the Statis-
tical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 
add-on PROCESS specifically designed to 
measure moderation and mediation ef-
fects (Hayes & Preacher, 2014). PROCESS 
tests indirect effects via bootstrapping, 
a nonparametric approach to estimate 
effect sizes that does not require certain 
“assumptions about the shape of the dis-
tributions of the variables or the sampling 
distribution of the statistic” (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004, p. 722). Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) suggest using 5 000 bootstrap 
samples to generate 95% bias-corrected 
accelerated confidence intervals; if the 
95% confidence interval (two-tailed) of 
the respective effect excludes zero, then 
the indirect effect is considered to be sig-
nificant (see also Hayes, 2017; Hayes & 
Preacher, 2014). Bootstrapping methods 
can be applied to analyses based on OLS 
regression models as well as structural 
equation modeling because both types of 
analysis yield similar results (Hayes, Mon-
toya & Rockwood, 2017). To account for 
potential confounding variables, we in-
cluded the mentioned control variables in 
the final model. All results are summarized 
in Figure 2.
The regression model explains 44% of the 
variance in trust in government (adjusted 
R² = 0.438, p ≤ 0.001). In response to our 
research question, which asks wheth-
er media use directly influences trust in 
government, the positive and highly sig-
nificant effect of media use shows that it 
directly influences the dependent variable 
(b = 0.107, t = 4.22, p ≤ 0.001); the more that 
respondents use media to access politi-
cal information, the more that they trust 
the national government. The results ad-
ditionally suggest that both mediating 
variables positively affected trust in gov-
ernment and that both predictors have 
the two strongest effect sizes in the final 
regression model. We observe that the ef-
fect of evaluations of politicians (b = 0.530, 
t = 11.01, p ≤ 0.001) is stronger than the 
effect of evaluations of the political pro-
cess (b = 0.263, t = 5.42, p ≤ 0.001). In line 
with previous empirical findings, satis-
faction with democracy (b = 0.077, t = 3.27, 
p = 0.001) and perception of the economy 
(b = 0.123, t = 4.72, p ≤ 0.001) both posi-
tively affect trust in government. Political 
interest (b = –0.106, t = –4.26, p ≤ 0.001), 
however, exerts a negative influence on 
the dependent variable, which indicates 
that the more interested respondents are 
in politics, the less that they trust the na-
tional government to implement favor-
able policies. Our results show significant 
effects for both age (b = –0.180, t = –2.61, 
p = 0.009) and gender (b = 0.006, t = 2.53, 
p ≤ 0.012). The older respondents are, the 
less they trust the government, although 
that effect is relatively small. By gender, 
Figure 2: Serial mediation model of the impact of using traditional media on trust in government
Evaluations of 
Politicians
Evaluations of the 
Political Process
Trust in GovernmentTraditional Media Use
b = 0.648***
b = 0.041* b = 0.055** b = 0.530***
b = 0.107***
b = 0.263***
First mediation effect: b = 0.022, 95% CI [0.001, 0.049]. Second mediation effect: b = 0.014, 95% CI [0.004, 0.031]. Serial mediation effect: 
b = 0.036, 95% CI [0.008, 0.070]. * p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** p ≤ 0.001.
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men have more trust than women in the 
government. 
H1 addressed the indirect effect of 
media use on trust in government mediat-
ed by evaluations of politicians. We com-
puted an OLS regression model using trust 
in government as the dependent variable, 
evaluations of politicians as the mediator 
variable and media use as the predictor 
variable. All control variables mentioned 
were also included in analysis. The results 
indicate that media use positively influ-
ence evaluations of politicians (b = 0.041, 
t = 1.99, p = 0.047), which in turn increases 
their trust in the government (b = 0.530, 
t = 11.01, p ≤ 0.001). The direct effect of me-
dia use on trust in government is mediat-
ed by evaluations of politicians (b = 0.022, 
BCa CI [0.001, 0.049]), which supports H1. 
Concerning the second mediator vari-
able, we ran another OLS regression model 
with trust in government as the dependent 
variable, evaluations of the political pro-
cess as the mediator variable and media 
use as the independent variable. In line 
with the assumptions of H2, media use 
affects evaluations of the political process 
(b = 0.055, t = 2.65, p = 0.008). The results 
further show that the indirect effect of me-
dia use on trust in government mediated 
by evaluations of politicians is positive 
and significant (b = 0.014, BCa CI [0.004, 
0.031]). In other words, the more that peo-
ple use media to access political informa-
tion, the more highly they evaluate the 
political process, which in turn prompts 
increased trust in government. 
H3 assumed a serial mediation effect. 
We hypothesize that the assessment of 
the second mediator (i. e., evaluations of 
the political process) is also affected by 
perceptions of individual politicians. Ul-
timately, the hypothesized effect of eval-
uations of politicians on evaluations of 
the political process is not only positive 
and highly significant (b = 0.648, t = 28.68, 
p ≤ 0.001) but also particularly strong. In 
line with H3, we therefore detect a sig-
nificant indirect serial mediation effect 
(b = 0.036, BCa CI [0.008, 0.070]). That find-
ing underscores the crucial role of person-
al perceptions of politics in the building 
trust in government. 
6 Discussion and conclusion
We conceived trust in government as peo-
ple’s expectations that the government 
would provide favorable political out-
comes. Drawing from literature in sociolo-
gy and political science, we also conceived 
evaluations of politicians and of the polit-
ical process as reasons for trust in govern-
ment. By introducing a novel reliable mea-
surement for such trust, our results can 
enrich the theoretical debate about what 
objects of trust in government encapsu-
late and their implications for empirical 
research. 
To investigate the media effects on 
trust in government, we scrutinized at how 
the use of traditional media to access po-
litical information affects the mentioned 
trust reasons and, accordingly, tested three 
mediation effects empirically. The results 
shed light on the importance of news me-
dia in democratic societies. Among them, 
the direct positive impact of media use 
to access political information on trust in 
government indicates that expectations 
regarding the government’s ability to de-
liver favorable outcomes are directly af-
fected by using traditional media. That 
finding can especially inform current ac-
ademic debates about media effects on 
trust in government, for we found no sup-
port for the media malaise hypothesis’s 
claim that media use decreases people’s 
trust in government. On the contrary, our 
results suggest that media use enhances 
trust in government, which supports the 
virtuous circle hypothesis. Political news 
media are often criticized for their (over-)
dramatization of political issues (Slattery, 
Doremus, & Marcus, 2001; Vettehen, Nui-
jten & Beentjes, 2005), and some scholars 
have even argued that news media cover-
age has contribute to the electoral success 
of populist politicians, including U.S. pres-
ident Donald Trump, by offering them a 
platform to garner attention (Sides & Lee-
taru, 2016). Our results, however, give rea-
son to assume that media use fosters posi-
tive effects on political attitudes because it 
increases the image of political personnel, 
democratic processes, and trust in the na-
tional government. 
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Our findings also reveal that using tra-
ditional media also indirectly affects trust 
in government. As we predicted, media 
use influenced respondents’ evaluations 
of politicians’ various character traits, 
both personal and professional, informa-
tion about which seems to represent an 
important means for citizens to form ex-
pectations of the national government. 
Although the personalization of politics 
has already been extensively discussed in 
political communication research (Van 
Aelst et al., 2012), its influence on political 
trust has not received much attention. In 
that sense, the finding highlights the par-
ticular importance of individual political 
actors in the political system in general. 
Giddens (1990, p. 85) argues that individ-
ual actors are crucial “access points” to the 
system in order for trust to be maintained 
or built up. However, we could not control 
for the basis of people’s evaluations; for 
instance, it remained plausible that re-
spondents were thinking primarily about 
certain members of the government while 
evaluating politicians in general, because 
certain politicians are more prominent-
ly covered by news media. Nevertheless, 
the finding reflects the great responsibili-
ty that politicians bear in representing the 
political system, for their individual mis-
conduct can erode trust in government as 
a whole.
Taken together, those findings indi-
cate that traditional media is an important 
means by which people form opinions and 
expectations about politics. Despite criti-
cism of the substance of political media 
content, our results show that news media 
increase people’s assessment of political 
personnel and processes. Instead of exam-
ining the effects of different media sepa-
rately (e. g., TV vs. newspapers), we used a 
joint measure to account for the entirety of 
people’s media use. Accordingly, our study 
opens up avenues for future research to 
further distinguish different kinds of me-
dia repertoires, assuming that people tend 
to rely on a variety of media outlets. In a 
sense, investigating the impact of different 
media repertoires on trust in government 
could prove to be more fruitful than the 
common distinction of different media. 
That approach could also pave a way to 
better understand the complementary im-
pact of traditional and digital media (e. g. 
Yuan, 2011). 
We also observe a serial mediation ef-
fect: that positive evaluations of politicians 
increase people’s perceptions of political 
processes, which raises their levels of trust 
in government. Because concepts such as 
transparency, responsiveness, effective-
ness, and the distributive justice of the 
political system are complex, in forming 
opinions people tend to generalize their 
evaluations of individual political actors 
to broader political processes. In line with 
the personalization hypothesis, the serial 
mediation effect suggests that citizens use 
politicians as valid indicators when evalu-
ating the quality of procedures in the polit-
ical system. From another perspective, our 
results also encourage further investiga-
tions into the indirect mediation effects on 
trust in government in traditional media 
environments.
The impact of evaluations of poli-
ticians on evaluations of political pro-
cesses in building trust in government 
seems evident at the national level, given 
the personalization of media discourses 
on domestic politics (McAllister, 2007). 
However, at the supra-national level (e. g., 
the European Union), an argument for 
reversed causation can be made. At the 
level of the European Union, for exam-
ple, processes of institutions such as the 
European Commission or the European 
Parliament receive more attention in me-
dia discourses than individual political 
actors do (Trenz, 2004). For that reason, 
people are liable to form opinions about 
lesser-known political personalities based 
on their evaluations of those institutions 
and their proceedings. In such cases, the 
logical order of the two mediators might 
be reversed. 
Before drawing some concluding re-
marks, we should identify some general 
limitations of our study. For one, because 
we relied on cross-sectional data, our 
statistical analysis based on the OLS re-
gression model could not provide proof 
regarding the direction of causation. To 
solidify the causal pathways between the 
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variables investigated, additional longitu-
dinal (e. g. Strömbäck et al., 2015) or exper-
imental (Avery, 2009; Mutz & Reeves, 2005) 
research designs are needed. However, 
because our study builds upon a long re-
search tradition in the realm of the media 
malaise and virtuous circle hypotheses, 
researchers have largely assumed the di-
rection of causation. Moreover, our study 
is limited in scope because we draw solely 
on a German sample. Future comparative 
research on mediation effects when inves-
tigating how media use influences trust in 
government could enrich literature on the 
topic and illuminate whether the indirect 
effects of the mediator variables would 
succumb to characteristics of the media 
system, the political system, or both. For 
instance, the evaluation of political pro-
cesses might differ between competitive 
democracies such as Germany and con-
cordance ones such as Switzerland. 
Governments require a certain de-
gree of trust from the electorate in order 
to make decisions about political issues. 
In our study, we investigated the impact 
of traditional media use on trust in gov-
ernment, and across the board, we find 
positive influences of political news media 
on different political attitudes. Media use 
encourages better images of politicians 
and more positive perceptions of different 
crucial aspects of the democratic process, 
including transparency, responsiveness, 
efficiency, and procedural justice. As a re-
sult of all of those factors, people tend to 
be more trusting of the national govern-
ment when they frequently use mass me-
dia to stay informed about public affairs.
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Appendix
Table 1: Questionnaire items for the mediator variables evaluations of politicians and 
 evaluations of the political  process
Evaluations Wording of the questions and items
Evaluations of Politicians “When you think of our leading politicians in Berlin, how much do you agree with the 
following  statements?”
Autonomy1 “Politicians are puppets of big business.”
Autonomy2 “Politicians dare to fight people in power.” 
Nonpartisanship1 “Politicians are able to overcome partisan bias.” 
Nonpartisanship2 “Politicians represent the opinion of their parties only.”
Leadership1 “Politicians have personalities suited to leadership.”
Leadership2 “Politicians follow up their words with actions.”
Leadership3 “Politicians are able to decide quickly and with confidence.”
Integrity1 “Politicians are sincere people.” 
Integrity2 “Politicians are reliable people.”
Integrity3 “Politicians pursue their own interests only.” 
Benevolence1 “Politicians fight for social justice.”
Benevolence2 “Politicians are people like you and me.”
Responsiveness1 “Politicians are aware of the problems that regular citizens face.”
Responsiveness2 “Politicians consider the opinions of citizens.”
Likeability1 “Politicians are likable people.” 
Likeability2 “Politicians have positive charisma.”
Evaluations of the  political  Process “Now, we have some questions about your impression of the political system in 
 Germany. How much do you agree with the following statements?”
Transparency1 “Citizens do not know which direction Germany is headed because nobody tells them.” 
Transparency2 “Citizens do not participate in politics because they lack the necessary information.” 
Transparency3 “German politics try to keep citizens informed.” 
Responsiveness1 “Government and parliament inform themselves about the wishes of citizens.” 
Responsiveness2 “Government and parliament try to satisfy the wishes of citizens.” 
Responsiveness3 “Government and parliament explain their policies to citizens.” 
Efficiency1 “In politics, addressing urgent problems is often postponed.” 
Efficiency2 “Too much time passes between political decisions and their implementation.”
Efficiency3 “Government actions are more expensive than originally calculated.”
Procedural justice1 “A citizen’s opinions are represented in political decision making.”
Procedural justice1 “Before political decisions are made, every citizen has a fair chance to voice complaints.”
